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This paper examines behavioural responses by companies to changes in profit taxation in their home
country. The elasticity of tax revenue with respect to changes in the corporation tax rate are decompo-
sed into a variety of responses. As well as distinguising real from profit-shifting responses, it is impor-
tant to separate the responses of gross profits from those of deductions (such as claims for past or cu-
rrent losses) where these are endogenously related to gross profits declared at home. This endogeneous
response can be expected to differ over the business cycle, which can be important for empirical esti-
mates of aggregate behavioural responses especially, but not exclusively, during cyclical downturns. It
is suggested that the revenue elasticity can be expected to be asymmetrical between periods of above-
and below-trend growth, arising from the asymmetric treatment of losses by the tax function.
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1. Introducción
This paper examines a number of diferent behavioural responses by companies to chan-
ges in the taxation of their profits in the home country. Such responses can take two forms.
First, there are real responses, whereby activities are transferred to other tax jurisdictions.
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ﾩ 2010, Instituto de Estudios FiscalesThe second form of response involves income-shifting in which the location of economic ac-
tivity is unchanged but the extent to which profits are declared in the home country changes.
Here there is of course a significant role for transfer pricing; see Gresik (2001, pp. 808-811).
In the context of personal income taxation, Feldstein (1995, 1999) introduced the concept of
the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the retention rate (one minus the tax rate).
Though this concept was initially proposed as a means of capturing real behavioural respon-
ses to tax reforms, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) showed that the concept can be applied to
any responses which cause the tax base to respond to exogenous changes in tax parameters.1
The closely related concept of the elasticity of taxable profits with respect to the corporate
tax rate is therefore central, and is the focus of attention here.
The components of companies’ responses are considered by decomposing this elasticity
and it is argued that it is particularly important to distinguish between the responsiveness of
gross profits and that of deductions allowable as profit off-sets. Where these deductions are
related to the size of companies’ profits, it is found that allowing for an endogenous, or au-
tomatic, response may be important for empirical estimates of firms’ overall behavioural re-
sponses.
Income shifting arises where multinational companies can change the extent to which
they declare their profits in different countries in response to diferences in international pro-
fits taxation, without changing their real activities. Empirical estimates suggest that these
shifting responses could be substantial; see, for example, studies by Hines and Rice (1994),
Hines (1999), Grubert and Slemrod (1998), Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) and Huizinga
and Laeven (2007). In addition, as Markusen (2002) and Devereux and Hubbard (2003) have
demonstrated, multinational firms’ decisions regarding whether to locate real production fa-
cilities at home or abroad, and trade between locations, can be influenced by profit taxation;
see also Feldstein et al. (eds) (1995). Real responses are not confined to multinational firms.
They can also be expected for purely domestic firms because increases in tax rates reduce
net-of-tax profits at the margin and so render some previously profitable production unpro-
fitable. In some cases firms may change to non-corporate status where personal and corpo-
rate income tax regimes differ.
The present paper begins by examining the elasticity for individual firms. However,
from a policy point of view, it is important also to consider what happens to aggregate tax
revenues. A second aim of the paper is to consider the potential behaviour of the aggregate
revenue elasticity with respect to the tax rate over the business cycle. In considering such
dynamics, an important role is played by the asymmetric nature of the corporate tax system
whereby losses do not give rise to a rebate, so that the use of loss pools over the cycle has a
substantial influence. The implications of this asymmetry are investigated using a stylised
dynamic process.
Section 2 defines and decomposes firms’ behavioural responses. Section 3 considers the
orders of magnitude of elasticities of tax paid with respect to the tax rate, for individual
firms, using possible orders of magnitude of important components suggested by previous
110 JOHN CREEDY AND NORMAN GEMMELL †empirical studies. The potential behaviour over the business cycle of the aggregate tax reve-
nue elasticity with respect to the tax rate is then examined in section 4. Conclusions are in
section 5.
2. Types of Behavioural Response
This section begins by defining alternative behavioural responses to corporate taxation,
decomposing these into real responses, profit-shifting and deductions-shifting. The context
is of a firm located in a home country, or tax jurisdiction, which may at some cost change
its declared profits in that jurisdiction in response to a change in the home tax rate. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, moving profits abroad which may or may not involve shifting
some aspects of real economic activity. For comparative static purposes, tax rates abroad are
assumed throughout to be independent of the tax rate in the home country, so that responses
to a change in the home tax rate can be interpreted as responses to a change in the tax
differential.
Subsection 2.1 begins by specifying the composition of taxable profits. Subsection 2.2
considers declared profits and deductions. Subsection 2.3 then decomposes the overall chan-
ge in a firm’s tax, in response to a change in the tax rate, into its various components. Sub-
section 2.4 considers the likely signs attached to the components.
2.1. Taxable Profits
For a single company, net taxable profits, PT, are defined as the difference between gross
profits declared for tax, P*, and total deductions claimed against those profits, D* = D(P*),
so that:
PT = P* –D * (1)
The firm’s tax liability, T(P*), is some function of PT. In many countries this is a multi-
step function, containing a number of rates and thresholds. However, within any range, tax
liability can be expressed as an equivalent single-rate structure. 2 Furthermore, the vast ma-
jority of corporation tax is typically raised at a main or standard rate. Hence it is suficient in
what follows to consider a single rate structure:
T(P*)=0 if PT≤ 0
= tPT= t(P* –D *) if PT> 0 (2)
There may (as in some European Union countries) be some form of nonrefundable tax
credit, associated for example with research and development expenditure. In most cases it
is possible to redefine such credits in terms of their deductions equivalent. 3 Hence in what
follows, the existence of credits is ignored.
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There is clearly an asymmetry in the tax treatment of profits arising from the fact that
losses do not give rise to a tax rebate, but instead are deductible against current or future po-
sitive profits within the corporation or group defined for tax purposes. This feature applies
to the UK, the US and numerous other countries’ corporate tax structures. 4 The implications
of this kind of asymmetry for investment behaviour have been examined by Auerbach
(1986), Devereux (1989), Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) and Edgerton (2007); see also
Auerbach (2007). It will be seen below to have important implications in the present con-
text.
For a firm with positive net taxable profits:
(3)
where dPT/dt measures the combined extent of real changes and profit shifting in response
to the tax rate change. Dividing both sides by PT and using the fact that dT/PTdt = tdT/Tdt
gives:
(4)
where in general ηx,y = (dx/dy)(y/x) denotes the elasticity of x with respect to y. Thus the
main elasticity of interest is the elasticity, ηPT,t,of net taxable profit with respect to the tax
rate. It is this elasticity that is decomposed, and examined further, below.
2.2. Declared Profits and Deductions
Allowing for behavioural responses requires the extent to which profits and deductions
are declared in the home tax jurisdiction to be specified. At this stage the use of different
‘schedules’ for different sources of income is ignored. Define θp as the proportion of total
gross profits, P, which are declared at home, so that, where time subscripts are omitted for
convenience:
(5)
Similarly, let θd denote the proportion of total deductions which are declared at home, and
let E denote qualifying expenditures eligible as off-sets against declared profit. These include
capitalallowancesarisingfrominvestmentexpendituresandaccumulatedlosses.Aproportion,
s, of these qualifying expenditures can be deducted, so that declared deductions, D*, are:
(6)
The deductions rate, s, is analogous to the term used by Devereux and Hubbard (2003,
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In the present paper, s represents the generosity of the tax code regarding all qualifying ex-
penditures, not just those on capital. To the extent that a firm’s total profits or qualifying ex-
penditures change in response to changes in taxes, whilst keeping constant the extent to
which they are declared for tax at home, these may be regarded as real. Alternatively, where
total profits or qualifying expenditures remain unchanged but the proportion declared at
home alters, some profit or deductions shifting can be considered to have occurred.
Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
(7)




and α is strictly greater than one as long as there are some declared deductions (that is D* > 0).
Key ratios used in later sections to examine the cyclical properties of behavioural res-
ponses to tax changes are the ratios of qualifying expenditures to gross profits, E/P, or the
ratio of declared deductions to declared profits, D*/P*, where the latter is more readily ob-
servable in taxpayer data. These ratios can be expected to vary over the cycle as increasing
or decreasing losses respectively raise or lower E and D*, relative to the profit variables, P
and P*. Equation (9) shows that α varies (positively) with these ratios.
2.3. Behavioural Elasticity Components
To identify the impact of real and shifting deductions responses to tax rate changes the
elasticity of net taxable profits in (4) can be expressed in terms of its components. Thus,
differentiating (7) with respect to t, and using the definition of α in (9), it can be shown that:
(10)
Equation (10) provides the basic decomposition of the elasticity of taxable profit with
respect to the tax rate for a single firm. The first term in curly brackets, {ηθp,t + ηP,t}, mea-
sures profit responses while the second term, {ηθd,t + ηE,t}, measures deductions responses.
The four component elasticities capture the four basic behavioural responses and are sum-
marised in Table 1.
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Table 1
RESPONSES TO A TAX CHANGE
Income shifting
Profit shifting θp = θp(t) dθp/dt < 0
Deductions shifting θd = θd(t,s) dθd/dt > 0
Real responses
Real profit response P = P(t) dP/dt < 0
Real deductions response E = E(t,s) dE/dt ￿ 0
The extent to which firms shift profits or deductions out of the home tax net is likely to
depend on the relative costs of each. For example, it may be easier to hide profits than to in-
flate deductions, depending on the specification of the tax code, the extent and form of en-
forcement activity, and the available evasion and avoidance facilities. 5
2.4. Expected Signs
In general the expected directions of change are indicated in the final column of Table 1.
These sign expectations assume that substitution effects dominate any income effects: this
accords with Gruber and Saez’s (2002) finding that compensated and uncompensated taxable
income elasticities are similar. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of taxable income
elasticity studies since Feldstein (1995, 1999) find the overall elasticity with respect to the re-
tention rate to be positive.
Even if the elasticity terms on the right hand side of (10) were to take similar values
across firms, differences in α would ensure that ηPT,t varies. In particular, as is evident from
(9), firms with a larger deductions base have a higher α, ceteris paribus, and hence a larger
absolute ηPT,t
6. As a result, profit-making firms with a recent history of losses (or profit-ma-
king members of a group with large losses elsewhere) and firms with large capital allowan-
ces can be expected, ceteris paribus, to have stronger negative responses to a tax change. For
firms declaring a current loss or zero profit, ηPT,t is of course zero. The sign of ηE,t in (10) is
complicated by the fact that, to the extent that some qualifying expenditures are related to
profits, there may be some automatic response of deductions to tax-induced changes in pro-
fits declared at home. For example, suppose a firm transfers production abroad in response
to a tax change, so that some profits previously obtained at home are now earned abroad. The
associated investment which shifts abroad, previously deductible from profits declared at
home, are no longer deductible. This automatic response can be expressed as the elasticity,
ηE,P*.
Furthermore, define the partial elasticity, η' E,t, which captures the extent to which firms
generate additional qualifying expenditures independently of declared profits (that is, the
elasticity of E with respect to t,when P* is held constant); this can be referred to as an
‘autonomous’ elasticity. The elasticity, ηE,t, can therefore be decomposed as:
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For example, where enforcement of tax rules make it easier for firms to generate ad-
ditional deductions via real changes to qualifying expenditures, rather than shift profits
or deductions abroad, η' E,t (and hence ηE,t) could be high relative to ηθp,t or ηθd,t in equa-
tion (10).
In general the sign of ηE,t is ambiguous. Consider the components on the right hand side
of (11). Although it is likely that η' E,t > 0 and ηP*,t < 0, the sign of the automatic response,
ηE,P*, depends on the type of qualifying expenditure and whether changes in P* arise from
changes in total profits, P, or changes in profit-shifting, θp. It might also be expected that
where the tax code causes a greater automatic response, that is, a larger absolute value of
ηE,P*, firms may adopt a larger autonomous shifting response, η' E,t, to compensate. Where,
for example, a tax rise leads to more investment overseas, firms may attempt to compensa-
te for the loss of capital allowances at home by shifting other deductions into the home tax
jurisdiction where they have a greater tax off-setting value.
The automatic response elasticity ηE,P* captures the extent to which, for given s and θd,
claimed deductions change as declared profits change. This is affected both by changes in
firms’ economic circumstances and by tax rules. In a situation of steady-state or trend
growth, a value of ηE,P* equal or close to unity might be expected, otherwise deductions
would become a persistently increasing or declining fraction of declared profits over the
long-run. However, away from the steady-state, ηE,P* may be greater than unity. This could
arise when, following a recession, deductions rise faster than profits. Alternatively it may be
less than unity, or even negative, during booms when past losses are exhausted and profits
grow faster than deductions.
It is often easier to observe declared deductions, D*, rather than the associated
qualifying expenditures, E, in taxpayer data. Hence it is useful to consider the equivalent of
(10) expressed in terms of declared deductions, D* and declared profits, P*. First, define the
elasticity, ηD*,t, using, as in (11):
(12)
where, as above, a prime on the elasticity indicates that P* is held cosntant; that is η' D*,t > 0
is the ‘autonomous’ elasticity of declared deductions with respect to the tax rate, for given
declared profits. It captures any tendency for higher tax rates to encourage increased deduc-
tions ceteris paribus via either real or shifting responses.
Then, differentiating PT = θpP –D * gives:
(13)
where ηP*,t = ηθp,t + ηP,t. Using (12), equation (13) can be rewritten as:
(14) η α αη η αη
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** * * * ,, ,, ' =+ () ( )This expression reveals three effects on the tax base elasticity, ηPT,t. The elasticities ηP*,t
and η' D*,t are the combined real and shifting responses for declared profits and autonomous
deductions respectively, and ηD*,P* is the endogenous or automatic deductions response. 7
Both profits and deductions have direct negative effects on ηPT,t. That is, the responses
of both to increases in tax rates (profit outflow, deductions inflow) serve to increase the ab-
solute value of ηPT,t. However, there is an additional indirect effect of a profit outflow, na-
mely the loss of some deductions, captured by ηD*,P*, that otherwise could be claimed
against declared profit: this reduces the absolute value of ηPT,t. From the first curly brackets
in (14) the direct effect dominates if:
(15)
This inequality identifies the conditions under which a reduction in declared profits in
response to a tax increase (whether via real or shifting effects) raises or lowers tax liabilities,
relative to the case where ηP*,t =0. If condition (15) holds, a negative profit response to the
increased tax rate generates a lower tax liability than when there is no response. However,
where condition (15) does not hold, the loss of deductions which could be used to off-set
profits, when declared profits are reduced by a tax rate rise, would have a net effect of incre-
asing firms’ tax liabilities. In this case, firms have incentives to shift profits into the tax ju-
risdiction when the tax rate rises due to the value of associated deductions.
In general, there is no reason to expect (15) to hold since it depends on how the endo-
genous response of deductions to profit changes compares with the relative size of deduc-
tions to profits. Both could be determined by different characteristics of a corporate tax
system. 8
3. Illustrative Examples
To illustrate orders of magnitude for the elasticity, ηPT,t, for a single firm or group, it is
necessary to consider possible values for the component elasticities. Subsection 3.1 first re-
views estimates from empirical studies which provide a guide to orders of magnitude rele-
vant to the UK’s corporate tax system. Based on these estimates, a set of benchmark para-
meters are described in subsection 3.2, after which subsection 3.3 presents numerical results.
3.1. Estimates of Response Parameters
Various estimates of responses are available in the empirical literature which can be
used to guide choices in producing illustrative examples and simulations reported below.
Income shifting responses were estimated for samples of multinational corporations by Bar-






116 JOHN CREEDY AND NORMAN GEMMELL †OECD country-level data on the share of labour income in value added, Bartelsman and
Beetsma (2003) estimated pure profit-shifting for OECD countries on average. Their central
estimate of profit-shifting is that about 65 per cent of additional revenue following a tax rate
rise leaks abroad.
Thus the elasticity of declared revenue with respect to the tax rate is around 0.35.
From (4), since ηPT,t = ηT,t – 1, the implied tax base elasticity is –0.65. Bartelsman and
Beetsma obtained UK parameter estimates close to the OECD average. This may be regar-
ded as an estimate of the profit-shifting component, αηθp,t –( α – 1)ηθd,t, rather than of the
total real-plus-shifting response. By focussing only on shifting responses Bartelsman and
Beetsma argued that their estimates could be regarded as lower bounds. More detailed re-
cent estimates for European multinationals, from Huizinga and Laeven (2007), are some-
what smaller for the UK than those derived from the Bartelsman and Beetsma results.
Their estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory tax
rate (of around 1.1 for the UK) implies an elasticity of –0.33, assuming a 30 per cent cor-
porate tax rate. 9
Grubert and Slemrod (1998) focused on profit-shifting to Puerto Rico by US multinatio-
nals, allowing for both real foreign investment and profit-shifting to tax havens. Though es-
timates of an elasticity are not readily derivable, their results confirm that substantial real
plus profit-shifting responses by US multinationals was mainly motivated by the profit-shif-
ting opportunities which the real foreign investment provides.
Hines and Rice (1994) examined aggregate 1982 country-level data for reported non-fi-
nancial profits of US parents and afiliates with investments in tax havens and other foreign
countries. They report that a 1 percentage point higher tax rate reduces reported profits by 3
per cent. Across such a wide-ranging sample of countries, the corporate tax rate is likely to
vary. An average of around 30 per cent implies an elasticity around –1; a 15 per cent tax rate
implies an elasticity around –0.5. The Hines-Rice elasticity probably includes both real and
profit-shifting responses and so approximates ηPT,t.
3.2. Benchmark Parameters
This subsection considers a set of benchmark parameters for numerical examples. The
following examples assume a steady-state, for which ηE,P* =1 with ηD*,P* = 1, so that:
(16)
Hence, in the steady state, the value of ηPT,t depends on α and the four elasticity com-
ponents in (16). These elasticities determine the real responses of profits, P, and qualifying
expenditures, E, and of the shifting parameters, θp and θd. The illustrations below also set
s –1 . The examples report values of ηPT,t as the ratio E/P varies. Hence the value of α also
varies as shown in equation (9) above.
η ηη αηη ʸʸ Pt tP t t E t T
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proportions, θp and θd, required to calculate α –1in (16). It might be expected that these pa-
rameters cannot be chosen independently by firms. For example, as Slemrod and others have
suggested, if it becomes more costly to shift further increments of profits abroad, then ηθp,t
and ηθd,t may become smaller as θp and θd are reduced. However, the numerical illustrations




Profit shifting ηθp,t –0.375 –0.625
Deductions shifting ηθd,t 0.25 0.5
Real profit response ηP,t –0.05 –0.1, –0.2
Real deductions response ηE’,t 0.05 0.1, 0.2
Proportion of P declared θp 0.8 0.6
Proportion of D declared θd 0.8 0.6
Deductions rate s 1.0 0.8, 0.6
The benchmark case assumes a 5 per cent real profit response to changing tax rates, but
alternatives of 10 per cent and 20 per cent are also examined.
Comparable positive values are used for the autonomous real deductions response,
η' E,t.With s = 1 and for a given θd, the response of qualifying expenditures is the same as that
for declared deductions. This response is referred to as autonomous or ‘discretionary’ to dis-
tinguish it from the automatic deductions response.
A benchmark elasticity of ηθp,t = –0.375 is assumed, with deductions shifting assumed
to be slightly more dificult such that ηθd,t =0.25. 10 Using E/P = 0.5 gives a value of α = 2
from (9) with s = 1 and θd/θp = 1.This yields a benchmark total ‘shifting elasticity’ of ηθp,t
–( α – 1)ηθd,t = –0.625.
These illustrative values should not be interpreted as representing ‘average’ responses,
since many firms’ responses could be expected to be very small or zero. However they serve
to illustrate the responsiveness properties of those firms with more substantial behavioural
reactions to tax changes.
3.3. Numerical Results
Some numerical results are shown in Figure 1, where each of the four diagrams shows the
elasticity ηPT,t on the vertial axis and the size of qualifying expenditures relative to total pro-
fits, E/P, on the horizontal axis, expressed as a percentage. Each diagram shows a range of pro-
files for ηPT,t, resulting from changes in one of the relevant parameters while leaving all others
fixed at their benchmark values. The top left and right hand diagrams show respectively the ef-
fects of varying the proportions (of profits and deductions) declared and the degree of shifting
118 JOHN CREEDY AND NORMAN GEMMELL †(again of profits and deductions). The bottom left and right hand diagrams show respectively
the effects of varying real profit responses and real deductions responses. The E/P ratio is not
typically observable in taxpayer data. However, for the UK the ratio of declared deductions to
profits, D*/P* = (sθd/θp)(E/P), is in the range 0.45 to 0.56 for companies in aggregate. 11
119 Behavioural Responses to Corporate Profit Taxation
Figure 1. Relationship between η ηPT,t and E/P: Individual Firms.
To interpret the diagrams, it is useful to bear in mind, as stressed above, that the impact
of the E/P ratio on ηPT,t operates via changes in α. At the extremes, as E/P tends to 1, then
with sθd/θp = 1 the weight α –1tend to infinity, so that the absolute elasticity, ηPT,t beco-120 JOHN CREEDY AND NORMAN GEMMELL †
mes infinitely large. And as E/P tends to 0, the term α –1tends to 0 and the elasticity is de-
termined solely by the first two profit-related terms in (16). In all the diagrams it is clear that
the E/P ratio has important, non-linear effects on the overall behavioural elasticity, ηPT,t.
The top left and bottom right hand side diagrams of Figure 1 reveal that changes in θp,
θd or η' E,t cause the benchmark profile to rotate (around a value at E/P = 0), whilst changes
in ηP,t cause the benchmark profile to shift (the bottom left hand diagram). The top right
hand diagram also reveals that changes in the shifting elasticities have differing effects on
the overall elasticity. An increase in the absolute value of ηθp,t causes the profile to shift
downwards whilst an increase in ηθd,t causes the profile to rotate clockwise. This difference
reflects the fact that the impact of ηθd,t on the overall elasticity is affected by α –1 , where-
as this is irrelevant to the impact of changes in ηθp,t.
These illustrations show how differences in α can affect observed profit and deductions
responses. However, by maintaining ηE,P* = 1 (or equivalently, ηD*,P* = 1), they cannot de-
monstrate the endogenous impact on deductions of changes in declared profits. This aspect
is likely to be important when considering behavioural responses at different points in the
economic cycle, and is examined in the next section.
4.  Responses over the Business Cycle
This section considers how the endogenous response of deductions to changes in decla-
red profits, ηD*,P*, might change over the cycle as, for example, the ratio of losses to profits
varies. This can translate into variations in ηPT,t over the cycle as shown in equation (14).
The resulting cyclical pattern observed for ηPT,t also depends on any cyclical changes in the
behavioural response elasticities. These might reasonably be thought of as fairly stable over
the cycle, though firms may seek to increase their autonomous behavioural responses when
endogenous responses otherwise restrict their ability to shift profits or deductions. 12
In this section it is convenient to work with the elasticity of net taxable profits with res-
pect to declared profits, ηPT,P* rather than the equivalent deductions elasticity, ηD*,P*. Diffe-
rentiating equation (1):
and the two elasticities are related as follows: 
(17)
where, as previously, α = P*/PT. That is, the two elasticities in (17) differ only by a factor
due to the relative size of declared profits and deductions. Substituting (17) into (14) then
gives:
ηα α η PP DP
T,,









Hence, if it is reasonable to assume that the behavioural elasticities, ηP*,t and η' D*,t are
relatively stable over the business cycle, the overall tax revenue response, ηPT,t, can be ex-
pected to follow a similar (but inverse) cycle to ηPT,P* (since ηP*,t < 0). 13
Since interest here is in the effect of loss asymmetries, this section focusses on loss-re-
lated deductions only, which are likely to be the main cyclically related deduction. 14 Ho-
wever, in examining the cyclical behaviour of ηPT,P* it is clearly of little interest to consider
only firms that are persistently in either profit or loss (for whom ηPT,P* is persistently 1 and
0 respectively) but to allow for firms that cycle between positive declared profits and losses.
In fact the key dynamic properties of ηPT,P* can readily be illustrated using just two firms,
each of which is taxed independently and obtains profits from just one source. This is equi-
valent to assuming that there is full flexibility in using losses from different sources in dif-
ferent time periods, with all losses fully deductible against any current positive declared pro-
fits: thus s = 1 in (6) above. More complex tax planning could be modelled, but the simple
model  developed here is suffcient to illustrate the relevant cyclical properties. 15 With more
than one firm it is necessary to consider the aggregate elasticity of taxable profits with res-
pect to the tax rate (across both firms), and its potential variation over the business cycle.
Using Ω to denote the aggregate equivalent of η, it can be shown that ΩPT,P* is a taxable pro-
fit share-weighted average of the individual elasticities:
(19)
where, in the present illustration, there are j = 1,2 firms.
Let gross declared profits in period i for firm j be P*
i,j; positive profits are denoted by P+
i,j =
max (P*
i,j, 0) and losses are P
–
i,j = max (–P*
i,j, 0). If Li,j is firm j’s loss pool in period i, carried
over from the previous period, the losses available to be used as deductions in period i are
thus PD
i,j = Li,j + P
–
i,j. Hence taxable profit for each firm is:
(20)
and the loss pool carried forward to the next period is: 
(21)
Suppose that there is no trend growth in profits, but P*
i,j follows a similar cycle for each
firm, described by a sine wave. 16 Hence, if A is the amplitude of the cycle and W is its wa-
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Figura 2. Gross and Taxable Profit Profiles for Firm 2
where dj is a shift parameter for each firm, determining the profit levels at central points of
the cycle (such as i =1,11, 21,…).
Suppose that firm 1 is such that, over the business cycle, profit always remains positive.








i–1,j divided by (P*
i,j – P*
i–1,j)/P*
i–1,j for i = 1, is always equal to 1. But firm 2 experien-
ces losses during some of the ‘depression’ periods. Profiles of gross and taxable profit for
firm 2 are shown in Figure 2. 17 Once gross profit becomes negative, asymmetric tax loss
treatment ensures that taxable profit is zero. But once the firm begins to make positive pro-
fits again, the loss pool built up during the periods of negative profits can be used to keep
PT
2 = 0. Hence where the dashed line, indicating PT
2, in Figure 2 follows the horizontal axis,




* = 0. Hence the aggregate elasticity ΩPT,P* must
be less than 1.
Eventually, as the loss pool of firm 2 moves towards exhaustion, there is a period during
which taxable profit is positive but less than gross profit, as the last of the loss pool is used.
In the example in Figure 2 this affects the individual, and hence aggregate, elasticity over two
periods. Moving into positive taxable profit the individual elasticity is infinitely large, and
then moving from the period when taxable profit is smaller than gross profit to that when they
are equal (when the loss pool has been exhausted), the elasticity is greater than 1. In aggrega-
te terms, taxable profit is growing faster than gross profit and hence the aggregate elasticity
must exceed 1. In Figure 2 the shaded area between the horizontal axis and the profile of ne-
gative gross profit represents the loss pool built up during the depression. This must be equal
to the subsequent shaded area above the horizontal axis. After this period, when gross and ta-
xable profits move together for both firms, the aggregate elasticity ΩPT,P* must again be 1.The profiles of aggregate taxable and gross profits are shown in Figure 3. The dashed line,
showing aggregate taxable profit, simply follows the gross (and taxable) profit of firm 1 during
the period when firm 2 makes losses, and also in subsequent periods when firm 2 is able to keep
its taxable profit equal to zero. Taxable profit thereafter moves up sharply to follow aggregate
gross profit. When the two aggregate profiles are identical, then clearly ΩPT,P* = 1.When firm 2
has no taxable profit, ΩPT,P* < 1, and for the period when firm 2 moves from zero taxable profit
to 0 < PT < P*, the (two) individual elasticities are such that in aggregate ΩPT,P* > 1.
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Figura 3. Aggregate Gross and Taxable Profits Over the Business Cycle
Figura 4. The Aggregate Elasticity of Taxable Profit with Respect to Gross ProfitThe elasticity profile is shown in Figure 4, where ΩPT,P* is measured on the right verti-
cal axis. This diagram also shows the profile of aggregate gross profit, measured on the left
vertical axis, so that the elasticity can easily be related to the business cycle. The horizontal
and vertical lines drawn through the aggregate gross profit sine wave mark the mid-points of
the cycles. As discussed above, the profile of the elasticity, ΩPT,P*, is horizontal until firm 2
begins to make a loss. It then dips down below 1 until firm 2 moves into positive taxable
profit, when the aggregate elasticity has a sharp spike before settling back to ΩPT,P* = 1 
during the remaining part of the ‘boom’ period of the business cycle and the start of the ‘de-
pression’ period up to the point where firm 2 starts to make losses again.
The question then arises of how the profile of the elasticity ΩPT,P* is affected by the ampli-
tude of the business cycle. Figure 5 compares two business cycles. The solid line is the relati-
vely low amplitude cycle, for which the previous results were obtained. The dashed line repre-
sents a cycle for which the wavelength is the same but the variation around the ‘zero growth’
positions is greater in both directions. Nevertheless, by construction, firm 1 continues to obtain
positive profits in every period. The first implication of a higher amplitude must be that firm 2
moves into negative profits at an earlier point in the depression phase of the cycle and does not
move into positive profits until later in the ‘upswing’. This, combined with the fact that the loss
pool built up during the negative profit periods is larger than with the lower amplitude cycle,
means that the elasticity profile is less than 1 for longer. The subsequent ‘spike’ in the elasti-
city profile is also greater. The two profiles are compared in Figure 6.
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Figura 5. Low and High Amplitude Business Cycles
These results demonstrate that the asymmetry in the tax function’s treatment of losses,
compared with positive profits, implies that over the business cycle the variation in the 
aggregate elasticity ΩPT,P* itself displays an asymmetric pattern. During part of the boom pe-riod the elasticity is unity but during the depression it moves below 1 as soon as firm 2 makes
losses. This is followed by a brief period when the elasticity exceeds unity, before it again
equals 1. A higher amplitude of the cycle cannot raise the elasticity above 1 during the rele-
vant periods, although the extent of the ‘spike’ above 1 is greater and the extent of the mo-
vement below 1 is greater. From equation (18), this means that the elasticity ΩT,t is relatively
high during depressions (when ΩPT,P* < 1) and relatively ‘flat’ and low during the phase
where ΩPT,P* = 1. That is, the relatively low endogenous response of taxable profits to gross
profits during depressions, contributes towards a higher value of ΩT,t, implying a smaller be-
havioural response of tax revenue to the tax rate. [Recall ΩT,t = 1 in the absence of any be-
havioural response; see equation (4)].
This simple model has considered just two firms. The introduction of additional comple-
xity arising from a distribution of firms does not affect the fundamental ‘asymmetry’ results.
However, the existence of more firms moving into and out of losses at different phases of the
business cycle must lead to a smoothing of the elasticity profile (rather than, for example, the
sharp drop below unity when firm 2 begins to make losses) and a longer period during which
the elasticity is above unity. The asymmetry over the business cycle nevertheless remains. This
is because of the fact that the use of losses as deductions is relatively unimportant in above-
trend growth (when aggregate losses are relatively small) but becomes particularly important in
below-trend growth when losses are larger on average. This, in turn arises because the taxable
profit distribution is effectively truncated at zero, unlike the gross profit distribution. Thus, large
losses both generate additional deductions and simultaneously limit the ability of firms to claim
them, until positive profits return (or they can be shared with group partners in profit).
Empirical evidence on the impact on corporate tax revenues of the asymmetry modelled
in this paper suggests that corporate tax revenues display much greater volatility than the
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Figura 6. Elasticity Profiles for High and Low Amplitude Business Cycles126 JOHN CREEDY AND NORMAN GEMMELL †
corporate tax base (taxable profits). For the UK for example, Creedy and Gemmell (2008)
show that large fluctuations in annual corporate profit growth tend to be associated with even
larger fluctuations in revenues, and vice versa. For the US, Cooper and Knittel (2007, p. 651)
find that ‘many tax losses are used with a substantial delay’ so that ‘certain firms and indus-
tries suffer a significant penalty from the partial loss refund regime due to the erosion in the
real value of their loss refund’. As a result up to 50 per cent of corporate losses remain unu-
sed after 10 years, and around 25-30 per cent of losses are never used. This evidence is con-
sistent with the findings of Altshuler and Auerbach (1990) and Auerback (2007) that cycli-
cal fluctuations in US corporate effective average tax rates are substatially due to tax loss
asymmetries. 18 In addition, examining the drivers of tax revenues in OECD countries, Clau-
sing (2007) finds that cyclical changes in those economies’ economic growth rates have dis-
proportionately large impacts on their corporate tax revenues; that is, faster growth is asso-
ciated with a rise in the corporate tax to GDP ratio.
This evidence clearly supports the view that asymmetric tax treatment of losses has a
substantial impact on observed revenues over time. This may or may not reflect behavioural
responses since, even in the absense of such responses, cyclical fluctuations in revenues and
effective tax rates would be expected. However, the evidence in this paper suggests an addi-
tional reason why such cyclical patterns may be expected; namely because behavioural res-
ponses are likely to be affected by these asymmetries, generating further cyclical movements
in revenues. As note earlier from the condition in (15), behavioural responses may either en-
hance or mitigate other sources of revenue fluctuations, depending on whether net taxable
profit responses to changes in corporate tax rates generate lower or higher tax liabilities com-
pared to when there is no response.
5.  Conclusions
This aim of this paper has been to examine the composition of behavioural responses by
companies to changes in the taxation of profits in their home country, and the possible 
pattern of such responses over the business cycle. Emphasis has been on the determinants of
the elasticity of corporation tax paid, by individual firms and in aggregate, in response to a
change in the corporation tax rate. This elasticity is closely related to the elasticity of taxable
profits (net of deductions) with respect to a change in the tax rate. In this respect the paper
may be seen as following the broad agenda set by Feldstein (1995) who emphasised the im-
portance of the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the retention, or net-of-tax, rate.
Firms’ responses to tax rate changes can take the form of real responses, in which real ac-
tivities change or are relocated to other tax jurisdictions, and income-shifting responses in
which the location of economic activity is unchanged but the extent to which incomes are de-
clared in the home country changes. The present paper has shown that it is also important to
distinguish separate responses of gross profits and of deductions allowable as profit offsets. In
particular, the overall elasticity of taxable profits with respect to the tax rate can be decompo-
sed into four elasticities relating to real/shifting and profit/deduction responses, along with the127 Behavioural Responses to Corporate Profit Taxation
ratio of gross declared proﬁts to taxable profits. The size and type of ‘qualifying expenditures’
(those that qualify as tax deductions) were shown to be important as this determines both the ex-
tent of deductions and their endogenous or automatic adjustment in association with profit chan-
ges. This endogenous response directly affects measures of overall tax responsiveness.
The endogenous deductions response can be summarised by the elasticity of aggregate
taxable profits with respect to gross declared profits. This was shown to be pro-cyclical,
leading to a variation in the elasticity of total revenue with respect to the tax rate that is coun-
ter-cyclical. However, this variation is unlikely to be symmetric, being especially pronoun-
ced in periods of recession. This asymmetry between booms and recessions arises because
of the asymmetric treatment of losses in the tax structure, together with the fact that losses
tend to be relatively unimportant as tax deductions in circumstances of trend, or above-trend,
growth. The asymmetry increases as theamplitudeofthe profit cycle increases. 
These findings have implications for empirical attempts to measure tax revenue or profit
responses to corporate tax rate changes. This is because the nature and extent of corporate tax
deductions, especially losses, can be expected to give rise to quite different response estima-
tes. This is especially true for countries where the tax structure displays greater asymmetry in
their treatment of losses, and circumstances where losses are high. In this context, firms are
likely to be more constrained by the endogenous tying of deductions to profits claimed in their
home jurisdiction. By contrast, even with asymmetric treatment of losses, response estimates
may be relatively unaffected when firms’ profits are on-or above-trend.
Empirical estimates of corporate behavioural responses differ quite widely even for the
same or similar countries. A range of conceptual, methodological or practical reasons might
account for this. However, the present paper suggests that additional factors to consider, lar-
gely ignored so far, are the differential asymmetric treatment of losses across countries, and
the point in a country’s economic cycle when responses are estimated.
Notes
1. A convenient feature of the concept is that, under certain conditions, it provides valuable information about
eficiency costs of taxation. For a recent review of evidence, see Saez et al. (2009). An introduction to the con-
cept is provided in Creedy (2009).
2. In the context of personal income taxation, see Creedy and Gemmell (2006, p. 25).
3. However, there may be special conditions governing when the credits can be claimed.
4. For example, in the UK system, a current loss under one profit ‘schedule’ may be offset against a current pro-
fit under some, but not all, other ‘schedules’. Thus a firm’s ability to utilise its losses immediately can depend
on the schedular characteristics of its profits and losses. Further conditions apply to firms which form part of
a group. See Ag￺ndez (2006) for discussion of intra-group loss off-setting among European firms.
5. Grubert and Slemrod (1998) suggested that ﬁrms which create opportunities for real profit responses, for
example by setting up foreign subsidiaries, are likely to find it easier to enagage in profit-shifting; indeed the
two may be joint decisions. As a result it might be expected that firms with larger values of ηP,t are more
likely to have larger values of ηθp,t.128 JOHN CREEDY AND NORMAN GEMMELL †
6. The term ‘larger absolute’ is preferred here to ‘smaller (more negative)’. Similarly, the term ‘smaller absolu-
te’ is preferred to ‘larger (less negative)’.
7. In a steady-state, ηE,P* =1 with ηD*,P* =1.
8. For example, the use of past and current losses as profits off-sets tends to generate a relationship between de-
ductions and profits. However, the introduction of other deductions which may be unrelated to profits, or chan-
ges in qualifying expenditures, can raise the level of total deductions allowable against profits.
9. However, the Huizinga and Laeven semi-elasticities are based on profits data in commercial accounts and are
not necessarily equivalent to the elasticity measured here which relates to net taxable profits.
10. If profit-shifting is driven by changes in the tax rate differential between home and overseas tax jurisdictions,
the assumed precentage change in the home tax rate is small compared with the percentage change in the dif-
ferential. For example if the home rate falls from 25 per cent to 23 per cent (a –8 per cent change) but the re-
levant overseas rate remains at, say, 35 per cent, the differential has changed by 20 per cent (from 10 per cent
to 12 per cent). Thus a relatively large response to a relatively small change in the home tax rate may not be
so surprising.
11. In the UK, data on all companies (excluding Life Assurance and North Sea Oil companies) over 1997-98 to 2003-04
show that the ratio of all deductions (excluding a small amount of tax credits), to gross declared profits, ranges from
a low of 0.46 in 1998-99 to a high of 0.56 in 2002-03. see http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/corporate_tax/table11_2.pdf.
12. Evidence for the US, reported by Auerbach(2007), suggests that, in aggregate, companies’ effective average
rates of corporate tax rise during recessions in association with increasing losses. Thus, if companies do inde-
ed engage in profit-or loss-shifting, these responses appear to be insufficient to conteract fully the impact of
exogenous profit-loss cycles.
13. However, α – 1 in (18) is also likely to be cyclical, as the ratio of deductions to proﬁts changes over the cycle. 
14. Capital allowances are the other main deduction in the UK system. To the extent that investment is related to cu-
rrent profits, these would tend to be pro-cyclical. However empirical data does not suggest a clear cyclical pattern.
15. Creedy and Gemmell (2008) use a microsimulation model to examine this aspect for the UK, incorporating
other loss asymmetries such as the limitations of group losssharing. The model contains algorithms for deter-
mining the tax-minimising strategy of firms. Ag￺ndez (2006) discusses alternative ways of allowing intra-
group losses to be used as tax offsets in the context of European formula apportionment, and where group
members are located in different countries. 
16. An exogenous cycle in gross profits, Pj, rather than declared profits, P*
j, is perhaps more appropriate but would
require explicit modelling of profit-shifting, θp,j, over the cycle. For the purpose of the present illustration it
is convenient to treat θp,j and Pj similarly.
17. The values were obtained using a wavelength of W = 20, an amplitude of 12, and shift parameters of d1 =30
and d2 = 4.
18. For the European Union, Ag￺ndez (2006) argues that adopting a common consolidated tax base across EU
countries would improve efficiency largely by allowing cross-border tax loss offsets in calculating the com-
mon corporate tax base. This might also be expected to have an impact on revenue fluctuations within EU
countries.
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Resumen
Este art￭culo examina las reacciones de las empresas a cambios en la tributaci￳n en su pa￭s de origen.
La elasticidad de la recaudaci￳n de impuestos ante cambios de la tributaci￳n de los beneficios empre-
sariales se descompone en varias respuestas. Adem￡s de distinguir entre los cambios reales y los cam-
bios de lugar de declaraci￳n de beneficios, es importante separar aquellos cambios en los beneficios
brutos de los relacionados con las deducciones (como las reducciones por p￩rdidas pasadas o corrien-
tes), donde estos ￺ltimos est￡n relacionados end￳genamente con los beneficios brutos declarados en el
pa￭s de origen. Esta respuesta end￳gena puede ser distinta en diferentes momentos del ciclo econ￳mi-
co, lo cual puede ser especialmente importante, aunque no exclusivamente, para las estimaciones em-
p￭ricas realizadas en los periodos de crisis. Los resultados sugieren que la elasticidad de la recaudaci￳n
puede ser asim￩trica entre periodos de crecimiento por encima –o por debajo– de la tendencia a largo
plazo, a consecuencia del tratamiento asim￩trico de las p￩rdidas en la fiscalidad empresarial.
Palabras clave: impuesto sobre beneficios empresariales, cambios en asignaci￳n de beneficios, elasti-
cidad recaudatoria, asimetr￭as fiscales.
Clasificación JEL: H25, H32.
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